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ideological infighting among dogmatic economists. Perhaps it is because it permits us to find
success with a limited objective of constructing models that can be confmned, rather than trying
to find universal 'truths'. Perhaps it merely is, as Popper fears, an all-too-easy way to avoid
criticism.
LA WRENCE A. BOLAND
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Conventions
There are a number of different terms used in economics to characterize social conventions and
conventional behaviour: conventions, rules and norms, and sometimes habits, routines, customs
and traditions. The vocabulary is not used entirely consistently, but economists tend more often
to emphasize rules, norms and conventions, with the latter concept acquiring more interest since
the development of game theory.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about conventions is their ubiquity. In daily life, there
are conventions about how to dress, how to speak to others, how to eat, how to wait in line,
and so on in truly an endless list. As sociologists note, there are conventions surrounding virtually
every activity we engage in. In economic life, innumerable conventions surround market
exchange, the forms of which include allowable free-riding, forms of competitive behaviour,
expectations about rivals, grounds for trust and mistrust, product quality and fair dealing. Yet
until quite recently economists, in their concentration on rational choice theory, have almost
entirely ignored the role conventions play in behaviour and decision making. It should come
as less of a surprise that the principal issue concerning conventional behaviour in economics
is how to accommodate rule and convention following to the theory of instrumental rationality.
The original literature on the SUbject, stemming from the work of Simon (1982), essentially
treats conventions and rules interchangeably, and looks upon them as broad decision strategies
alternative to case-by-case decision making. People are procedurally or boundedly rational, not
substantively so, and thus they employ rules and conventions to economize on scarce
computational resources. Knudsen (1993) traces this to a self-reflexivity, infinite regress
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problem in traditional rational choice analysis, where to exercise choice we must first decide
whether it pays to make a choice, which itself requires that we decide whether it pays to decide
whether it pays to make a choice, and so on. Thus conventions and rules are essentially
simplifying devices individuals use in decision making.
Yet if rules may be understood as personal means of saving on costly computations, rules
in another sense are shared by individuals who are in regular interaction with one another. Here
we may also distinguish rules from norms by noting that, whereas shared rules can describe
established patterns of behaviour, shared rules in the sense of norms are established patterns
of behaviour that individuals believe ought to be maintained, either in a moral or pragmatic
sense. This normative force some rules have is not explained by seeing them as decision makingsimplifying devices. Why is it, that is, that individuals feel compelled to observe conventions?
Lewis (1969), following Hume (1978) and Schelling (1960), has been very influential in this
regard by getting economists to think about conventions as patterns of interdependent behaviour,
or in game-theoretic terms. On his view, conventions are solutions to coordination problems,
where individuals adopt a norm or convention, as in Axelrod's (1984) analysis, tit-for-tat in a
repeated game or game with no foreseeable end, to solve prisoner's dilemma-type problems.
That the 'cooperate-unless-the-other-doesn't' norm here is in each individual's interest
reinforces its observance and thus explains how individuals can come to believe they ought
to follow rules and conventions. Lewis's basic definition of convention is thus:
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent situation
S is a convention if and only if, in any instance of S among members of P,
(I) everyone conforms to R;
(2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;
(3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that others do, since S is a coordination problem
and uniform conformity to R is a coordination equilibrium in S. (Lewis, 1969: 42)

A refinement on this is that what has come to be known in game theory as the common
knowledge assumption also holds. Gilbert (1989) provides a critical analysis of Lewis and the
game-theoretic approach to understanding convention.
An important issue raised by Lewis's approach concerns how conventions come to be
established at all. Sugden (1986, 1989) has developed a game-theoretic explanation of the
emergence of conventions, not restricted to coordination games, in which individuals first play
a symmetrical game in which they do not know the best strategy to adopt and thus repeatedly
playa mixed set of strategies until, through trial and error, they learn the proportion between
the strategies that maximizes their expected utility. The resulting Nash equilibrium is said to
be stable in an evolutionary sense, and the players are said to play evolutionarily stable
strategies, or ESSs (a concept which comes from the work of the biologist Maynard Smith (1982)
who was concerned with the evolution of patterns of behaviour in animal species). Assuming,
however, that more than one stable equilibrium and set ofESSs is available, it can then be shown
that, if for any reason whatsoever (say, some 'accident of history') one set of players begins
to play asymmetrically, that is, to play one way in certain circumstances and another way in
other circumstances, it will be in the interest of all players to adjust to this asymmetrical strategy
of play, if the initial number of adherents to the new form of play is significant. This
asymmetrical or context-dependent play, when it becomes fully established, constitutes
a convention.
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Sugden thus takes conventions to be rules or nonns regulating social life that obtain in games
with more than one ESS, that come about through evolution, that are self-enforcing and that
(following Hayek, for example, 1960) reflect anarchic or spontaneous order as the unintended
consequences of individuals' acting rationally in tenns of their own preferences. The answer
to the question of how conventions come to be established is that they are not chosen, but simply
evolve without design. Indeed, on Sugden's view, the market as a form of spontaneous order
itself depends upon institutions, particularly private property rights and enforceable contracts,
which are best understood as conventions resulting from an unintended process of evolution.
More generally, Sugden distinguishes three broad categories of conventions: coordination
conventions, property rights conventions and reciprocity conventions.
A crucial issue for this view concerns how specific conventions come to evolve rather than
others, especially since the initial development of a convention sets in motion a self-reinforcing
process that ultimately makes that convention more viable than others. Following Schelling,
evolutionary game theorists have appealed to the intuitive idea of prominence and salience, that
is, aspects of a situation that stand out in individuals' common experience and serve as focal
points around which individuals coordinate their decisions. This raises difficult epistemological
issues, however, since it is not easy to say why some things are prominent in our experience
and others not so.
Sudgen nonetheless elaborates on Schelling's point to argue that, if prominence is a matter
of common experience, conventions may spread by analogy from one context to another. An
example is the 'first come, first served' principle of queuing that seems to have many
applications. Such an account may be question-begging, however, since it seems the very drawing
of an analogy itself presupposes the existence of prior conventions about how we recognize
similarities between old and new situations, thus posing the possibility of an infinite regress
in the argument. Relevant here, then , is the philosophical literature going back to Quine
(1953) on similarity and analytic judgment.
Other researchers in this tradition have emphasized that, just as conventions can come into
being, so they can also pass out of being. Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis (1995) note that
the conclusion of an evolutionary process is unlikely to be pure stasis, and that a potential
weakness in evolutionary game theory's account of conventions is its failure to explain the
subversion of established conventions, or how particular conventions break down and are replaced
by others.
An interesting conclusion of the game-theoretic approach to the understanding of conventions
is that evolution need not produce conventions that are optimal (as also suggested by the existence
of such conventions as the QWERTY keyboard). Sugden's account of the way in which
conventions come to be established through accidents of history explains how this is possible,
and it is not difficult to produce examples of games in which inefficient conventions in tenns
of player payoffs become self-perpetuating. This conclusion contrasts with Hume' s view that
rules and conventions tend to operate in the best interest of society. It also raises questions about
the wisdom of seeing the market as an invisible hand process that always works to bring about
the greater social good. If conventions evolve spontaneously, and if many of the conventions
involved in the market are Pareto-inferior to other conventions we may imagine, then the
evolution of the market may be irrational in important respects. This point may be extended
by noting that market conventions are sometimes unjust and discriminatory.
These latter conclusions clearly turn on our having standards for evaluating conventions that
are independent of the perspectives generated by their evolutionary success. Hume resisted this
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possibility by arguing in his account of the origin of the principles of justice that the norms of
justice are merely long-observed conventions to which we have come to annex the idea of virtue.
No higher standard for judgment can thus exist apart from our conventional beliefs and,
should some conventions appear inefficient or unjust, we might best attribute this to lags in
individuals' acceptance of those conventions.
Needless to say, few moral philosophers today would take such a view seriously. In the first
place, it is qUt!stionable that moral principles are reducible to conventions and, in the second
place, moral principles are not often thought merely a matter of preferences, particularly for
those in a more deontological tradition. Perhaps more important for economics, however, is
the fact that Sugden does not restrict his analysis of conventions to coordination problems, thus
allowing some conventions regarding moral norms to favour some people at the expense of
others. Were economists to come to look upon moral norms in this way, Pareto efficiency
judgments might lose some of their appeal, and perhaps begin to develop a richer conception
of the types of normative judgments appropriate in economics.
JOHN B. D AVIS
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Critical Rationalism
A central aspect of Karl Popper's philosophy of science is what he calls 'critical rationalism ' .
Popper is often credited with explicitly creating critical rationalism in Chapter 24 of his Open
Society and its Enemies, but to some extent it is also implicit throughout his Logic of Scientific
Discovery. With the word 'critical' Popper wishes to make clear that his form of rationalism
differs from that most closely associated with classical eighteenth-century rationalism that Voltaire
satirized in Candide. Classical rationalism is based on an optimistic belief that it is possible
to be rational about everything - and for this reason Popper called this 'comprehensive
rationalism'. According to Popper, comprehensive rationalism is part of a more general theory
of knowledge which asserts that every knowledge claim must be justified by a proof. Popper
and his followers call this theory 'justificationism' .
Whether or not rationalism is comprehensive hinges on whether or not every true statement
can be proved with a rational argument. According to Willard Van Quine, only tautologies can
be proved true (Quine, 1965). Whether this limited notion of comprehensive rationalism is all
that one can hope for depends on what one means by a true statement. In one sense, Quine's view

